The energy policy as a field of EU's limitations and conflict among the member states and the EU by Lichwa, Katarzyna
ZN TD UJ – NAUKI SPOŁECZNE, NR 1 / 2010 
______________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
 29 
 
 
 
 
KATARZYNA LICHWA 
 
 
THE ENERGY POLICY AS A FIELD OF EU’S LIMITATIONS 
AND CONFLICT AMONG THE MEMBER STATES AND THE EU 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Since the establishment of the European Community in 1957, significant developments 
have taken place in the European energy policy, driven by complex global challenges like   
the climate change, increasing energy prices and the security of supply in the European Union 
(EU). The very recent 2009 gas crisis between Ukraine and Russia further intensified the dis-
cussion within the EU about the weaknesses of the EU’s energy policy and the lack of supra-
national instruments to successfully respond to the world’s energy challenges, such as the gas 
crisis in January 2009.  
Taking into account the fact that collectively the EU member states import half of their 
energy needs and this figure is expected to rise, reaching 64 percent in 2020 and 67 percent 
in 2030, member states are seriously concerned about introducing specific policies to secure 
their energy supplies
1
. However, due to the importance of the energy policy, it is often de-
scribed as one of the fields of major conflict of interest between the Commission, member 
governments and interest groups
2. Over the past decades the EU’s 27 member states have 
ceded to the EU institutions some national sovereignty in the sphere of energy issues, never-
theless energy policy remains primarily the responsibility of the individual member states. 
While member states have been moving towards increased integration in some areas of energy 
policy, the process has been halted in others.   
The aim of this article is to present the nature of the EU’s competences in energy poli-
cy and to suggest that the power and instruments that the EU’s institutions currently possess 
                                                 
1
 International Energy Agency, IEA Energy Policies Review European Union 2008, IEA 2008, p. 19. 
2
 J. Haaland-Matlary, Energy Policy in the EU, Macmillan Press Ltd, London 1997.  
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are not strong or efficient enough to develop common and coherent EU energy policy; with its 
present tools, the EU is not able to manage the necessary political arbitrage between all 27 mem-
bers on the issue of common energy policy.  
The first part of the paper will focus on the general character of the EU’s energy policy. 
The milestone events in the evolution of that policy will be presented, together with the legal 
provisions for energy-related issues in the EU’s Treaties. The article will also present in par-
ticular those EU instruments which are available to introduce legally binding rules on the mem-
ber states in order to achieve some degree of cooperation and common standards. The third part 
will describe all challenges that the member states face in the area of energy policy and which 
make the development of a common EU energy policy extremely difficult, if not impossible 
to achieve.  
 
EVALUATION AND NATURE OF THE EU’S ENERGY POLICY 
 
The Energy policy in the EC/EU did not play an important role, despite the fact that 
the two original treaties, the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) and Euratom, both 
concerned energy. The European coal policy existed under the ECSC from 1952 until 2002 
and in relation to its nuclear policy, the EU has a clear remit only through the Euratom Treaty 
of 1957
3
. However both treaties did not lead to the development of a common energy policy 
and focused only on managing coal and steel production and developing a powerful nuclear 
industry among the signatory states.  
Until the 1980’s there was a very little progress towards a common energy policy and 
the member states with their different domestic energy resources, different energy require-
ments and large, state-owned monopolistic energy industries, preferred essentially national 
management of energy policy
4
. 
Nevertheless, significant changes in the sphere of energy policy were introduced after 
the 1980’s, when the Single European Act was introduced in 1986 and it was realised that   
the internal market would not be complete without a freer energy market. However, there was 
still no possibility of introducing a uniform EU energy policy, which could be driven by the 
Commission and the other EU institutions, because European energy markets continued to be 
considered as a traditionally strong national domain, controlled by the national governments:    
the member states showed no interest in ceding their power. However, after 1986 numerous 
                                                 
3
 International Energy Agency, op. cit., p. 42. 
4
 N. Nugent, Energy Policy, [in:] The Government and Politics of the European Union, Palgrave Macmillan, 
London 2003, p. 315-316. 
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directives were introduced as a consequence of the establishment of the EU’s internal market. 
They were implemented in the areas of competition, interconnection, energy flows, efficiency 
and environment and to some degree regulated and coordinated the rules concerning energy 
policy. For example: the result of the 1990’s negotiations between the EU authorities, the mem-
ber states and the interest groups were the Electricity Directive (Directive 96/92/EC) and Gas 
Directive (Directive 98/30/EC) which for the first time set the common rules for the EU ener-
gy market
5
 .Due to relatively strong opposition from some member states, the first market 
directives included soft reform provisions and lacked a number of instruments to supervise  
the market within the member states. Moreover, in December 1994 the European Energy 
Charter, which had been prompted by the Commission, was signed by 50 countries including 
all EU members. Its core objectives were: “the creation of a regime of energy management 
based on the principles of the market economy, the regulation and promotion of trade and in-
vestment in the energy area, and the mediation in any disputes that might arise from these chal-
lenging undertakings”6.  
Further Commission efforts to include energy policy in the legal framework of the EU 
met with strong opposition from the member states. During the negotiations on the Maastricht 
Treaty, three EU energy producers – Germany, Britain and the Netherlands – vehemently op-
posed the inclusion of a chapter on common energy policy in the Treaty on European Union
7
, 
and, as a result, the chapter on energy was deleted from the final text of the Treaty.  
At the moment there is no specific article on energy in the currently ratified EU trea-
ties; energy–related legislation has been introduced regarding the environment, approximation 
of laws, trans-European networks, difficulties in the supply of products, research and external 
relations
8
 .  
The evolution of the EU’s energy policy and its scarcely changing intergovernmental 
character proves, that despite many opportunities to enlarge the scope of the EU’s competences 
in the energy sphere, member states constantly opposed the idea and it was one of the gov-
ernments’ highest priorities to retain their sovereignty over that issue. In spite of the fact that 
the member states agreed to transfer some national competences to the EU institutions in a va-
riety of areas like economic and trade policies, the energy policy remains largely in the scope 
of member states’ authorities. Nevertheless, although there are no legal articles in the Treaty 
directly concerning energy policy that would transfer authority over the energy towards the EU 
                                                 
5
 International Energy Agency, op. cit., p. 39. 
6
 S. Muller-Kraenner, A Common European Energy Policy, [in:] Energy Security, Earthscan, London 2007, p. 83. 
7
 J. Haaland-Matlary, op. cit., p. 48. 
8
 International Energy Agency, op. cit., p. 96. 
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institutions, the Commission has some important instruments to influence particular stages 
of decision-making process, especially in the areas where the member states have not yet 
developed their own policies and at the same time to provide a limited level of political 
arbitrage between the member states.  
The second part of the paper will analyse the Commission’s powers in implementing 
its objectives towards the energy policy and its ability to develop among its 27 different 
member states a common policy which is coherent enough to play a significant role in global 
energy market.  
 
THE COMMISSION AS AN ARBITER BETWEEN THE MEMBER STATES OVER THE ENERGY ISSUES 
 
As has been stated above, the most important EU supranational institution in the sphere 
of energy is the European Commission which on the basis of Treaty regulations does not have 
a legal power to introduce a homogeneous, EU -coordinated energy policy. It is still an exclu-
sive competence of the individual member states to determine the national energy mix and    
to sign bilateral agreements with the third countries. However, in terms of the energy sector, 
the Commission has exclusive rights to initiate policy and to intervene in its role as a guardian 
of policy implementation. The Commission is producing policy proposals in the form of draft 
directives, based on draft communications. As Haaland-Matlary argues: “This agenda setting 
may be important not only for defining policy problems and their subsequent solutions, but also 
for defining member states’ positions at the later stage of negotiations”9. 
 The main actors in energy policy of the Commission are the Directorates for Transport 
and Energy, Competition, Environment, Enterprise, External Relations, Research and Trade
10
. 
Proposals that come from one directorate must be checked by other directorates. Obviously, 
the Transport and Energy Directorate is the major actor in energy policy within the Commis-
sion. Because of rapid changes in global energy market, increasing concern about Europe’s 
reliance on Russian energy (about half of the EU’s natural gas imports and 30 percent of its 
imported oil come from Russia)
11
 and growing pressure to address global climate change, 
since year 2000 there has been a greater involvement of the Commission in developing more 
coherent and coordinated energy policy within the EU. The Commission has risen to the chal-
                                                 
9
 J. Haaland-Matlary, op. cit., p. 107. 
10
 International Energy Agency, op. cit., p. 101. 
11
 P. Belkin, The European Union’s Energy Security Challenges, [in:] CRS Report for Congress, Congressional 
Research Service, Washington 2008, p. 17. 
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lenges, proposing a range of policies to address them, through a number of new directives, 
recommendations and the Strategic Reviews. 
In 2006 the Commission produced a Green Paper on “European Strategy for Sustaina-
ble, Competitive and Secure Energy” [COM (2006) 849], which identified six key policy ob-
jectives to address the new global challenges: competitiveness and the internal energy market, 
diversification of the energy mix, solidarity, sustainable development, innovation and tech-
nology, and external policy. Generally, according to the Commission, each member state can 
make energy policy choices based on its own national preferences, but they should be based 
on the EU’s three main objectives: sustainability, competitiveness and security of supply12. 
Furthermore, in the Commission’s communication from January 2007, “An Energy 
Policy for Europe” [COM (2007) 1], and in Second Strategic Energy Review published in No-
vember 2008, the Commission readdressed the need for cooperation and implementation of its 
three core policy objectives in the states’ energy policy agenda. The Commission proposals 
were largely supported among the Members of the European Parliament, which reflects a sig-
nificant shift from treating energy policy as a fully member states’ domain, to a more Euro-
pean concern. One of the MEPs, Andras Gyurk argued: “The EU’s energy policy is still cha-
racterized by bilateral talks and private deals. We need to link the Member States’ electricity 
and gas grids and agree on storage capacities to further improve energy solidarity”13. Never-
theless, the Commission is not simply using publications and Action Plans to influence        
the member states to adopt more cooperative and coherent energy policy that would be based 
on the same EU’s objectives. The EU-developed energy policy objectives are supported by    
a number of instruments and tools that have significant impact on member states’ energy poli-
cy agenda.  
First of all, there are “market based tools”14 influencing prices, such as taxes and fiscal 
incentives. Even though the EU does not have competences in the area of direct taxation,       
it has the power to set minimum taxation rates for certain products, including energy (indirect 
taxation). For example the Energy Taxation Directive (Directive 2003/96/EC) is regulating 
the minimum excise rate for fuel and minimum rates for the use of different energy resources 
                                                 
12
 European Commission. COM(2006) 849 final: Green Paper follow-up action – Report on progress in renewa-
ble electricity. [Online]. Available at: http://www.managenergy.net/products/R1594.htm [March 16, 2009]. 
13
 European Parliament (2009). Gas Crisis highlights need for energy security say MEPs. [Online]. Available at: 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/news/public/story_page/051-47949-033-02-06-909-20090202STO47914-2009-
02-02-2009/default_en.htm [March 16, 2009]. 
14
 European Commission (2009). European Energy Policy. [Online]. Available at: http://europa.eu/scad-
plus/leg/en/s14001.htm [March 16, 2009]. 
KATARZYNA LICHWA – THE ENERGY POLICY… 
______________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
 34 
for business use and non-business consumers
15
 . The same tax regulations among all 27 mem-
ber states reduce distortion of competition, influence a more efficient use of energy due to   
the relatively high minimum tax rate, and at the same time fulfill two of the Commission’s 
core objectives in relation to sustainability and competitiveness.  
Secondly, the Commission possesses instruments that influence quantities through di-
rectives such as the EU Emission Trading Scheme Directive (Directive 2003/87/EC). 
Launched on January 1, 2005 and running to December 1, 2012, the Directive is the largest 
multi-country and multi-sectoral Greenhouse Gas emission trading scheme in the world,     
and the Commission’s major tool to force energy efficiency improvements among member 
states
16
. The Directive on Electricity Production from Renewable Energy Sources (Directive 
2001/77/EC) which sets national indicative targets for renewable energy production from in-
dividual member states, also represents the Commission’s tool to influence the member states’ 
behaviour in the sphere of renewable energy resources, and further fulfilment of the EU’s core 
policy objectives. 
Moreover, the Commission has a significant impact on member states’ behaviour 
through developing energy technology, especially technologies for energy efficiency and re-
newable or low cost energy
17
. When Euratom came into force, the EC began to fund joint 
research programmes over technology and energy issues; however there was still a high level 
of disorganization in the involvement of the member states. For instance, both Italy and Ger-
many had started their own nationally funded programmes in order to prevent France from 
continuing to dominate that sector
18
 . The task of the Commission is to create a European re-
search landscape that together with national research and development programmes will inte-
grate the work on national and European level; will build a long-term partnership, and will 
increase exchange of information within the EU. To achieve that aim, the Commission in-
troduced a comprehensive, long- term strategy for Europe’s Energy Technology objectives. 
“A European strategic energy technology plan (SET plan) – towards a low carbon future” 
[COM (2007) 723], proposed by the Commission in 2007, is composed of measures relating to 
planning, implementation, resources and international cooperation in the field of energy tech-
nology. The SET Plan distinguishes the long and short-term EU’s objectives for the energy 
technology sector and highlights the fact that if the member states want to achieve these goals, 
                                                 
15
 International Energy Agency, op. cit., p. 35. 
16
 European Commission (2005). Emission Trading Scheme (EU ETS). [Online]. Available at: http://ec.euro-
pa.eu/environment/climat/emission/index_en.htm [March 18, 2009]. 
17
 Europa: Activities of European Union. European Energy Policy. [Online]. Available at: http://europa.eu/scad-
plus/leg/en/s14001.htm [March 18, 2009]. 
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collective efforts and cooperation among the EU, the member states and private sector are ne-
cessary. Furthermore, the SET plan sets out the creation of specific institutions that extends 
cooperation and research among the member states.  
Similarly, the aim of the European Energy Research Alliance (EERA) is to expand, 
strengthen and optimise the EU energy research capabilities, through sharing of national facil-
ities in Europe and the joint realisation of pan-European programmes
19
. Additionally, a steer-
ing group created by the Commission in 2008 and made up of representatives of the member 
states, should be a platform for discussing strategic planning and implementation of the Euro-
pean Energy Technology Policy, including the objectives of SET Plan and other related 
Community Programmes. The European Community Steering Group should also focus and 
foster the EU’s joint actions and measures, “matching specific instruments to the needs of dif-
ferent technologies, to ensure an optimisation of overall energy Research, Technological, De-
velopment, Demonstration and Deployment efforts in the European Research Area, through 
joint programming and concerted actions”20.  
 By taking a lead in coordinating the member states’ national programmes in the sphere 
of energy technology and by the creation of an advisory body that consists of high-level re-
presentatives from the member states and from the European Commission, the Commission 
is trying not only to influence current member states’ energy strategies but simultaneously 
to have an impact on shaping individual states’ future long-term energy actions towards a more 
sustainable, coordinated and EU-oriented approach.  
The Commission can affect national governments’ energy policies through the proper 
use of the available Community financial instruments. The Commission introduced various 
programmes, funded by the European Union, to strengthen competitiveness and innovation 
capacity in the EU, which are among three EU objectives introduced by the 2006 Green Paper 
and by the 2008 Second Strategic Energy Review. In 2006 the Competitiveness and Innova-
tion Framework Programme for years 2007-2013 (CIP) was established on the basis of the EP 
and the Council decisions (Decision 1639/2006/EC). Its main goal is to encourage national 
governments and the enterprises within to use information technologies, environmental tech-
nologies and renewable energy sources. The CIP programme consists of three sub-programmes 
and includes a wide range of policy objectives. Moreover, the CIP’s important objective is    
to create an EU-wide network of actors capable of participating in European as well as national, 
regional and local initiatives, furthering substantial energy use and as a result extending       
                                                 
19
 European Energy Research Alliance. [Online]. Available at: http://www.eera-set.eu/ [March 19, 2009]. 
20
 SET-Group-2008/003-rev, 2008, 1. 
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the share of experiences through dedicated networks
21
. The framework programme has been 
allocated a budget of 3.621 billion euro for the period from January 1, 2007 to December 31, 
2013
22
 and offers an attractive field of co-operation especially for the new member states (af-
ter 2004 and 2007 enlargements) and their businesses.  
Another important EU programme that forms a part of the Commission’s financial in-
struments to influence the member states’ energy policies, is “The Seventh Framework Pro-
gramme (2007-2013): Building the Europe for Knowledge”(FP7)23. It represents the EU’s 
major instrument for funding research and plays a crucial role in reaching the goals of growth, 
competitiveness and employment. Moreover, the programme focuses on stimulating coopera-
tion and improving links between industry and research within a transnational framework
24
. 
The programme covers various energy research areas and this is also reflected in the composi-
tion of the budget for the programme: “Under FP7 3.35 billion euro is allocated to non-
nuclear energy research from 2007 to 2013, and 2.751 billion euro for nuclear research for  
the period to 2011 (…). This contrasts with 9.05 billion euro for information and communica-
tion technologies and 6.1 billion euro for health and reflects the drafting of FP7 before sus-
tainable energy research emerged as a key concern at the EU level”25.  
One the one hand, the Commission seems to have a relatively large number of power-
ful instruments to alter the member states’ behaviour on the issue of energy policy. Market-
based tools, in the form of indirect taxes and common minimum tax rates for specific energy 
resources can successfully shift the member states towards more sustainable and more ade-
quate behaviour in conformity with the EU’s common policy objectives. Moreover, the estab-
lishment of energy technologies and various research and development programmes together 
with significant financial instruments give the Commission an important apparatus to act as  
an arbitrator between all 27 member states in developing common and coherent energy policy 
of the EU. However, the various challenges that the EU members face in changing the energy 
environment and very distinctive member states’ preferences in the area of energy policy, 
seem to exceed the Community’s competences and actions over that issue and push the states 
to introduce their individual, mostly self-interested policies. 
The next part of the article will present the current challenges that national govern-
ments face in the area of energy policy and will try to prove that given the current scope of 
                                                 
21
 International Energy Agency, op. cit., p. 190. 
22
 European Commission (2009). CIP – Competitiveness and Innovation Framework Programme. [Online]. 
Available at: http://europa.eu/cgi-bin/etal.pl [March 20, 2009]. 
23
 Decision 1982/2006/EC. 
24 
Ibidem, p. 190. 
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 Ibidem, p. 192. 
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Commission’s competences in energy policy, the member states must basically introduce their 
own separate energy strategies and that in this respect the EU cannot manage the necessary 
political arbitrage between all member states. 
 
THE MEMBER STATES’ STRATEGIES TO DEAL WITH THE ENERGY CHALLENGES 
 
As has been stated above, despite the EU’s institutions and especially the Commis-
sion’s efforts to introduce a common, fully coordinated EU energy policy, the energy sphere 
still remains in the scope of the individual member states’ competences and as with foreign   
or defence policies, the states vigorously protect their sovereignty in that area. There is a num-
ber of important reasons why the decision making power has not been transferred to the EU 
supranational level and why the Commission cannot manage the political arbitrage between 
the member states to develop one, coherent EU energy policy. 
First of all, there are significant differences among the 27 EU member states in terms 
of their energy policy objectives. Each member state faces relatively different external factors 
due to its geographical location, availability of domestic primary energy resources or even 
very diverse national preferences towards nuclear energy and the share of renewable sources 
in its energy mix. Because of that it is extremely hard, if not impossible, to find a common EU 
consensus among the member states that would be satisfactory enough to achieve a unified 
position on energy issues in the international arena. For example: some EU countries have 
their own energy resources, such as gas (the Netherlands and the UK), oil (Denmark and     
the UK), lignite and coal (the Czech Republic) and nuclear (the Czech Republic) and are not 
highly dependent on the external resources
26
. On the other hand, there are countries within   
the EU such as Belgium, Spain and Poland that are highly dependent on foreign energy re-
sources. E.g. Poland has a very small and not yet liberalised gas market and is very dependent 
on Russian gas supply. Both France and Germany have an important share of local primary 
energy sources in their energy mix (nuclear for France, and coal and gas for Germany) and 
their import dependence is slightly below the European average
27
. Additionally, the member 
states have different attitudes towards the use of renewable energy. In Finland and Sweden, 
renewable energy is a high priority. Finland, Latvia and Sweden have so far the largest share 
of renewables in their energy mix and all three countries have already put in place the appro-
                                                 
26 
L.H. Roller, H. Delegado, H.W. Friederszick, Energy: Choices for Europe, Brugel Blueprint Series, Brussels 
2007, p. 19.   
27 
Ibidem, p. 20.  
KATARZYNA LICHWA – THE ENERGY POLICY… 
______________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
 38 
priate measures to meet the Kyoto targets
28
. Furthermore, national public preferences towards 
nuclear power vary significantly among member states.  
After assessing all the evidence in relation to significant differences between national 
interests of the member states, it is not surprising that finding an agreement on energy policy 
is a very complicated task. The EU countries face the energy challenges from different start-
ing points and with different needs and priorities; if the Commission wants to find the neces-
sary consensus among a range of states’ interests, it will have to include it all in one EU poli-
cy, and this appears to be too complex a task even for such a developed and multiplex actor  
as the European Union.  
Secondly, it can be argued that the introduction of a common and coherent EU energy 
policy is not equally beneficial for all member states due to the different needs and perfor-
mance of individual member states, which can result in strong opposition among particular 
states towards the development of such policy. The adoption of some measures may imply 
higher costs for some countries than for others. Small countries such as those in the Central 
European or Baltic states are in a weaker negotiating position with foreign upstream suppliers 
and may find it beneficial to face such negotiations under an European umbrella. However, 
large countries or the ones with relatively low foreign dependence such as France or Germany 
may actually lose significantly from giving an European dimension to their external policy. 
Similarly, states with few domestic resources (Austria, Greece, Latvia and Luxembourg) 
might see domestic competition as a real threat to their security of supply. Finally, countries 
like the UK or Poland, which have a low share of renewables in their energy mix and limited 
sources of renewable energy, might see renewables as an expensive option that might endan-
ger their security of supply
29
. As Roller argues “…common European energy policy cannot 
simply ignore the current situation of each Member State, as well as the differing mix of costs 
and benefits of such policy for each country” 30. For some member states introducing an indi-
vidual energy policy is simply more beneficial in terms of costs, and no national government 
is fully willing to sacrifice its prosperity and welfare in the name of more united and coherent 
European Union action on the international arena. 
 Another argument supporting the thesis that despite the strong Commission’s efforts  
to introduce the common EU energy policy the member states are not able to arrive at an agree-
ment in this respect, is the fact that very often the Commission’s goals and objectives are con-
                                                 
28 
Ibidem, p. 22. 
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 Ibidem, p. 21. 
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trary to the member states’ interest. If at the moment member states are having significant 
problems in fulfilling the Commission’s three objectives, the extension of the EU’s power     
in that area may complicate even further the member states’ position and can be against their 
national self-interest.  
At present, with the current scope of the Commission’s objectives agreed among    
the member states, national governments may find the polices designed to increase the effi-
ciency, to secure supply and to protect the environment against their national interest and pre-
ferences, and even now they are using a number of trade offs
31
. Different countries are intro-
ducing versatile types of trade offs, depending on individual factors (geography and natural 
resources) and preferences (such as attitudes towards nuclear energy or renewables), but they 
all share the same objective – to protect their national interest by “playing” with the Com-
mission’s rules. A scholar Hendrik Roller distinguished three types of national trade offs in 
the present scope of the Commission’s regulations: the trade off between competition and 
securing supply, the trade off between supply security and environment and finally the trade 
off between competition and environment
32
.   
 The trade off between competition and securing supply is argued to be the most com-
mon trade off among the member states. In terms of the Commission’s competition objective, 
dependence on foreign energy resources is leading the member states to support national 
champions; “to offset the market power of up-stream energy producing countries, and to se-
cure their energy supply governments are tempted to support the creation of large horizontally 
and/or vertically integrated energy companies”33. There are a few recent examples throughout 
Europe (2003 merger of E.ON with Ruhrgas in Germany, 2006-2007 merger of Endesa      
and Gas Natural in Spain) where governments have prompted the creation of large national 
champions while reducing competition, arguing that such mergers and takeovers promote 
further investment and supply security
34
. Some countries seem to support large national ener-
gy companies to secure investment and access to primary resources at the expense of domes-
tic competition and the Commission’s competition objective. The participation of the state     
in European energy companies is very high among the member states; at the same time these 
companies hold a very important position on their domestic market. For instance Estonian 
“Eesti Energia”, which represents 92 percent cent of total national market, is fully state-
owned; France has 80 percent of shares in the energy company GDF, which holds 95 percent 
                                                 
31
 Ibidem, p. 22. 
32
 Ibidem, p. 23. 
33
 Ibidem, p. 26. 
34
 Ibidem, p. 28. 
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of overall market share and there are similar examples in other countries, such as Latvia, 
Hungary, Italy or Sweden
35
. This practice does not include all member states and varies        
in scope. It is particularly evident among the states with a relatively high import depen-
dence. 
Another type of national trade off is the one between supply security and the environ-
ment. This type of national trade off is strongly linked with the state’s energy mix. Different 
energy sources present significantly various CO2 intensities, and at the same time the energy 
mix reflects the diversification of energy suppliers and the level of import dependency.      
The trade off between an optimal energy mix from a supply security perspective, and an op-
timal energy mix that is adequate to the Commission’s environmental objectives depends      
on the individual state energy performance. For instance, member states whose energy use 
is mostly based on the use of nuclear energy (France, Finland), may find it acceptable to re-
duce import dependence and the CO2 emissions by relying on their own nuclear energy re-
sources. On the other hand, countries with significant coal reserves (Germany, Poland) may 
shift to coal as a way to reduce their import dependence, facing a trade off between the securi-
ty of supply and the reduction of CO2 emission
36
. The evidence shows that even though coal 
consumption in Europe has been decreasing since 1990, some countries such as Germany 
and Spain are returning to coal as a reliable replacement for nuclear energy, due to an increas-
ing demand for energy and increasing price instability, whereas Poland is using its coal re-
sources to decrease its dependence on Russian gas. Needless to say, some member states seem 
to ignore the EU’s environmental objectives in order to increase their future security of sup-
ply, at the expense of not reducing their CO2 emission.  
The last type of a trade off occurs between competition and the environment and is 
strongly linked to the associated cost and benefits from the renewables. According to re-
search, despite the significant increase in prices of non-renewable energy resources in recent 
years and future instability in their prices, the renewables are still less attractive for the mem-
ber states in economic terms. The associated cost, necessary to produce a unit of renewable 
energy (solar, wind, biomass) is much higher than the required investment for a comparable 
non-renewable energy output. Examples from Ireland or Denmark, which are among the most 
successful in reducing CO2 emission, support the thesis that the reduction of CO2 emission is 
accompanied by large increases in electricity prices, especially in the short term. As a result 
higher energy prices can have a significant effect on the competitiveness of national indus-
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tries, due to differences in energy prices among member states. Some member states are try-
ing to “relax” their environmental policies in order to secure their domestic companies from 
competitive disadvantage and making their domestic market more attractive for foreign inves-
tors.  
National trade offs in various aspects of the Commission’s energy policy objectives 
are excellent examples of the significant differences among the member states’, first of all    
in national energy performance and secondly in individual countries’ preferences and aims    
in the energy sector. Three types of trade off are the proof that even at present, with limited 
EU presence and interventions into national energy policy, various states are inclined to adopt 
various trade offs to gainsay the Commission’s aims and adopt the most self-interested energy 
strategies. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
It can be concluded that energy policy is a very complex and rather problematic issue 
for the EU authorities. Despite the high level of integration on various political fields, energy 
policy remains a crucial issue in national policy strategies: one which the states vigorously 
protect from an external intervention. As it was presented in the main body of the paper,  
the European Commission has some competences and instruments to influence the individual 
states’ energy policy; however they serve only to regulate and to revise the existing national 
polices of the EU countries. The EU is unable to influence the member states’ decisions       
on bilateral agreements or their energy mix. The lack of direct legal status for EU compe-
tences over energy issues in any of the EU treaties is weakening the Commission’s role in   
the member states’ energy policy framework. Moreover, looking at the significant diversity 
among the member states in the spheres of energy performance, dependability of supply, 
needs and priorities, as well as unequal costs associated with the adoption of the EU common 
energy policy, it appears almost impossible that the EU can manage the necessary political 
arbitrage between all 27 member states to develop a common and coherent energy policy.    
On the one hand, the absence of workable energy policy leaves many EU states without         
an alternative to this type of intergovernmental approach; but on the other that kind of ap-
proach leaves no space for more EU involvement and coordination.  
Nonetheless, it must be highlighted that this kind of intergovernmental attitude may 
change in the future, due to the growing common energy challenges, a growing number        
of energy crises that have an impact on most EU member states and the more obvious advan-
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tages for national governments that stem from speaking with one voice, representing huge 
market with over 450 millions consumers. However, at the moment the Commission can only 
make the best use of its limited competences and continue to steer national governments to-
wards a more coherent, unified European direction. 
 
 
STRESZCZENIE 
 
Mimo głębokiej integracji państw członkowskich UE na płaszczyznach wielu polityk, polityka energetyczna       
i najważniejsze decyzje z nią związane nadal pozostają w gestii państw członkowskich. Mimo wielu podjętych 
kroków, Komisja Europejska wciąż nie jest w stanie wypracować na tyle zdecydowanej i skutecznej strategii 
energetycznej, aby zachęcić państwa do jednolitych i wspólnych działań w dziedzinie energii. W niniejszej pracy 
zanalizowano główne kompetencje i instrumenty instytucji unijnych w dziedzinie zapewnienia bezpieczeństwa 
energetycznego. Udowodniono, że przy obecnych uwarunkowaniach i minimalnych instrumentach prawnych 
dostępnych Komisji oraz sprzecznych interesach państw członkowskich zarządzanie polityką energetyczną po-
zostanie nadal w gestii poszczególnych krajów. 
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